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Thifl pApPr st4diefl systPnwtirally hoW diffPrPnt sulaptivP expPStation n11Px a8'PCt thP
stAbility oi rAtionAl PxpertRtion rYluiGbriA (REE) in OLG modPlv. WP dixtulgllieh 1Parn-
ing about pricP IevP.lr~ wid inHAtion rateA. When t1~Pnt.r form price PacprxtRtiorix aa Rn
AVP.CA~P. Of 1)SIRL ~rIf.PA, LIIP.n t}IP, m04P.tAry RLP.A!(y ALALI) LP.n(IA LO bP. BtAI)1P.. TÍ1P, alltarlLy
SLP.AÁy SLRLP. LC 114RLAbIP IP.VP.T341g LÍ1P, flLAbillty IlE tIIP. LWO RtAtlonATy ÍI.EF 4n(1Pl PM-
fert. forPxight. When RdRptivP P,xpe,r.tAtionx Are fonnP~í wcirig inflation rAtex, then both
REE rstn bP etablP. Roll~lily, If LlIP. f:1lrrPnL 41RALIOn CRLP, iA inf.IllfÍPd m thP forer.lwting
r111P. LÍIP,n L.Í1P. AIItArI[y };.EE LP.nfÍA t0 bP, fltAh1P.. WhP.II AgP.ntR AI'P. [PAtrICtC(i t0 Only 14if!
IR~P(I Oh4P.iVP(í iRÍIALIOn, LI1P.n LhP. n104P.LNy IIFiE tP.n(1R t0 ÍIP. RLAh1P.. WP. flIlOW hOW
thP fanuliar OLS leuning fitx mlr rexlllts Rnd wP demorLatrAtP thRt tíiffPrr.nt rP.grPlwionx
yiP,](l (l1ÍfPSP,rIL SLAbIIIty rPAIIILR. F1nally, WP, rP.IAtP. MI! AnAIyR1R t0 P.7CI1M'tALIOnAI RtaÍ)ility.
Z
1 Introduction
How Rtab(c iR equilibrium Relrction via adaptivr. exprctatiouR with rr~lpect to thc Ictuving
Rpeciticatíou? This paper Rtndi~x Rystematically how diffcrent adaptive exp~.r.tation nt1eR
affiv,t thc Rtability of ratioual expa-tation r.quilibria (REE) in dyuamic moclclR witó mliltiplc
REE. Whilc rnlr reRU1tR arc V:illd for a Wldc rangc of dyIIamlc nlodclR, wc focuR particnlarly
ou overlapping gencrationx (ULG) modelR Riuce moRt of the exiating lite.rature iR concerned
with thiR c1RxR of modclR. In particldar, wc find that rrxtultR of carlicr RtudicR (e.g. Luctw
(198fi) :wd Marcet and SarBcut (1rJ89)) which fnnud that certain adaptive Ictuving ntlc~
rlclect thc 'good' monetary REE do not hold if agentR Icarn about inHation rateR aud arc
allowed to t11cc rntmnt int3ation into account. For thiR caRC we Rhow that the `baai' antarky
R.EE iR loca~ly stablr. for a wide cIaRR u[ ruiaptive expectatiouR forulxtiun. If aqeutR are
rostricted to ingged inflation ur if the weight pnt ou current inflation h~.rnmeR uegligible aR
timc BneR to infitiity, then thc autarky REE iR unRtablc. The Marmt and Sargent (1989)
OLS lcarning Rprcification bclongR to thiR clasR of Icarning ntlcx. But Rlightly diffemnt
OLS reqreR.gionR yicld oppoRitc resultR. F5lrthcrmorc, wc prmidc a gencral rrxlult whcn
expectationR are formr.d aR a rnnvex combinatirnl of past prir.c levele.
Dynamic macmccanomic ulodclR often have ulnltiplc REE. Une particularly well-Rtudiecl
CIACS OF F11Ch mOCiCIR IR thc cl.-wR of OLG modclR following SamucalRnn (1958) with moncy
and govcnlutent. dc.ficit. Spccifically, there arc two REE with rnnRf.ant ittflation rateR. Thc
luw iuHatiuu ratc R.EE h:w thc nxu.J comparat.ivc Rtsd.ic propcrtit~, whilc tllc hi};h inflatiou
REE h.~s `pcrvcrsc' comparativc Rtatin;, aR Marcr.t atld S.u~gent (1rJ8tJ) pnt it. Thc low
iuflati~n REE iR locally unstablc undcr pcrfect foreRight Ro that moRt pathR rnnvcrgc to the
lligh inflation REE iu which money hax no valuc. In othcr wordR, pcrfcrt. forcRíght Rclcrts
the 'bad' equilibrium whoRC properticR make little oconoutic Ret)xc. Au ilnportant qucRtiou
iR how Rtability of theRC REE are affected oncc the Rtrong axRUmption of perfect foreRight
iR rr.pl.~u:ed by adaptive expectation formation. Do aciaptivr, expr.rtationR change Rtability
of REE? If Ro, whicó adaptive nt1eR lcad to Rtability of one or thc othcr REE? IR it even
poRRible to diRCard certain REE bcv~llue no Reneiblr, adaptive nlle rnnvcrt;eR to thc REE? If
that iR thc caRC thcu adaptive exprctationR might Rcrvc aR an viablc equilibrium Rclection
dCVIC,C. SCC for ex.ltnple Sargent (1~J3) for a forcr.fitl arglttuent in thiR dirc.r.tiou. TheRc
qucRtions have bcrn Rtudicd of ULG modelR for examplc by LucaR (198G) and Marcet and
Sargent (198tJ). LucaR (198G) RhowR that if agentR fore.rast priceR via the Rample average of
obRCrvcd past pricc IcvclR, then the Rtability of the two REE iR oppoRite than undcr pcrfcct
foreRight. Most prim pathR converge to thc low inHatinn REE. Marcet vld Sargent (1989)
ronHrm LucaR' result when agentR uRC an OLS regr~lRinn of past price IevelR (excluding
curreut priceR) to fomcast uext perirxi'R inHation. Arifovic (IrJ92) findR that agentR Ieatving
via a qenetic algorithm a1RO couvcrgc to thc low indation REE. All of thcRe RtudicR point to
the conjcrture that thc luw inflatiott R.EE tendR to l)C Rtah1C 1lndCr :UiaptlVC CXpf:Ctat10IIR
whilr. thc high inflation REE iR not. Sincc all thr,RC papr.rR Rpc.r.ify vr.ry Rpecific Icaming
r1ilcR, vt importlnt queRtionR iR, how mbust theFC reRUltR arc.
Inatrr~ui of lu:ing very specific aciaptivc lcarnín}; formR, we aim at more general Icarning
RpecificatiolLg. ThiR a11owR uR to pinpoiut thc moRt important fcaturcxc of a~laptivc nileR with
reRpcet to equilibtiltm Rclection. Wc diRtinl,nliRh betwmn two diffcrcut claxw~R: learning via
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avcra{;in{; p:uzt prir'e tevelx :uic1 inJintion mtca. Wc provc a gencral mxnlt whir'h atatr~ that
when pricc expecaations arc in the convex hnll of past pricc~x and Rutticir.nt wcight is put
on rc.rcut ol~rvatione, then prices will rnnvcr{;e tn the low in8atimi REE. Au example of
thie clacs is Lucas (1cJ8fi). But sprcifying Ir.arniug ou thc hania of pricc Ievclec hnx euimc
undoeirablc propcrtica. If pricc~ have bc.r.n iucrc.vcing sincc thc iuiti:J pcriod, :ucy forcraxt
which liea in thc rnnvex hcdl of thc~c ptwt prict,x will bc bclc~w the I:uct prico. Iu other
words, agent.a ex{„xt a rir.Hatirln clcxcpitc pccxitivc iuHatinn in all prr.viocu pcriocLg. Thcu
Icarning about inflation ratex xcrn~ morc appcaliug. Unfortunatcly, thcre arc no gencral
rc~cultR iu this raxc and all of thc following rrRnltx arc lor'al to thc REE. Wc atndy adaptivc
expectationx which nxe laet {x~riod'e r.xpc.rtcxi in9ation aud either curreut or la~ecl reali~.ecí
infiation :w ar{,nimentx fnr forrV:rwtin{; next period's intlation: (i) a~~~ - F(a„ac) and (ii)
x~~~ - F(~r;,xi-c). It. turnx ont that thie timin{; whethor to inclnde cnrrent or la~ed
iuHaticm ia cn~cial fnr etability. Nutc, that in gcucral cnrrcut inHation ix in thc informatiou
ru~t nf agcutx, c.g. when agents arc alloweci to enbmít expcrtation Ac6Miulc~rc. Hencc current
in9ation crui in principle t~ nxed to fomc:~t iuHation. Some weak rerarictiona ou the form
of thc fnnction F auid itR dcrivativc~x am mrulc tn r,btain thc rc~nltx. Wc fincl that thc high
iuHatiou REE is stable undcr nilc (i) and unetablc cmdcr nile (ii). Stability of thc low
inflatiou R.EE is not as clcarcnt, but if it ix stablc cucin{; apecificatinu (ii) thau it ix al~
atablc nning Kpcrification (i). Ouc i~uportauit mxnlt is thnR, that thr. hi{;h inHatiou REE can
bc etablc with :ulaptive expc.rtationtf which ie in contraet to thc Lucxw (1rJ8G), Marcet and
Sarqr.ut ( IcJ89) and Arifovic (1~J2) atudics. Thc kcy dr,tcrminxnt for thc stability of the high
in9atiuu REE ia how tnuch wcight is pnt on cnrrent inflation when forecaxting tomorrow's
inflatiou. Generalizing thc above apecifir'ations to r~low fnr time-v.-u~ying wcightx, we find
that when the wcight ou cnrrcut iuHation gocx to zeru as time {;rows, thcu thr, high iuflation
REE bcromes nnstahle. Ax aci illnstratiun, wc deu:uiutratc nsiug the f.wiiliar OLS cxacnple,
that different OLS regrexrsionx yicld diffcrent xtability rcxulta.
Finally, wc rnmparc rnu stability rrlcultx to that of expcv~tatioual wtability (E-etability).
See Lucas (1cJ78) aud DeCauio (197rJ) for the first dehnitions nf this concept aud Evanx
(1985, 1989) and Evans and Houkapohja (1~J2, 1~J3, 1~J4ab, 1~J5) fr,r rcrent rc~ults.
InFtcad of lcarning pricnc or inflation ratc.x dirn~tly, E-xtabilíty atudic~ Icarning thc law of
motion nf thc economy in fictitious timc. It turns ont that only thc low inflation REE ix
E-atablc while the high iuHation REE ie not E-:aablc. We ahow that E-~;tability iF cku3ely
liukt~ci tc, rcal tiinc adaptivc Icsu-uiuq and yiclcls thc Ramc atability conditions when thc
wcight pnt nu current inHatiou in thc adaptivc mal timc Ictu~ning nilr, gocR to zcro.
Ii.clated literritnre inclndc Bray (1982) who xtndicx adaptivc lcarning in a cobweb model.
Gnesucric .wd Woodford (1~J1) etudy thc xtahility of cycl~ with tulaptivc Ir.arning ndrn.
The xtahility of xunapots nnrlcr Icsu'nin8 haa been studiMl by Woodford (1~J0), Evana (1989)
aticl Evvis .uitj Honkapohja (IcJcJ2). Bcrtocr'hi and Wanq (1rJcJ4) bok at Bayc~ian laarninR
in OLG models. Howitt (1~J2) presunts a policy motivated Rtudy of interest rato coutrol
anci Icarniu};.
Thc rext uf thc papcr ia ur{;:wir.~cl :w fulluwe. Scrtinn 2 prc~uts t.hc- h~xic OLG uiodcl,
definch thr. REE aud StntÍlc N Rtahlllty undcr pcrfa~t fnrcr.ight. Scr'ticcn 3 pn~nta a lincar
exampla Section 4 atndic~ Ie..lruinq iusin{; avera};es of paxt pricen, rrection 5 prc~w~uts the
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rcRUItR when RqcntR IcRrn inHRtion rRtrx. Scrtion l3 rclRt~xt the rnniltR to the c:oncept of
E-RtRhility rwd Rec:tion 7 conchld~.
2 The general model
Two qencrRl c1RRRC~ of dynRnuc mocíelR c:Rn he written RR
( I ) n~ - T(P;t l )
Rna
(2) ~x~ - A~~ xiil).
In mMíel (I) thc vRriRblc of intcreRt iR p,. ItR c~uxont vRlnc iR only dependent on thc onc
period Rhesui expcctation. OLG mcxielR whem the dynRrnirn Rre dctinecl ovcr priceR Rtc
of thiR typa Howevcr, when thc IRw of motion nf thc OLG model iR writtr.n in tcrmR of
inflation rRt~l, the current vRluc of inflRtion dependR not only of expectation Rbont next
pericxí, but RIRn on inflation expcrtRtionR from thc IRRt period. Henr.c vw~ neexi to define
the Rliqhtly more qenerRl modcl (2). The particulRr RhRpc of the mxpping T Rnd U depend
on thc rnncrcG~ modd to bc RtudiMi. Thcy Rrc Rllowact tn bo nonlinr.Rr. Wc will fociul on
mcxlclR with overlRppinq qenr.rationR RR rnnr.rctc examplcR.
Siuce there iR no imcertRinty, Rqr.ntR hRVa pcrFcrt foreRiqht Rnd the REE cRn bc written
nR firRt-order diffcrence MuationR
(3) p~ - T(nlt l )
Rnd
(9) a~ - W(x,, x~f 1).
Stntint~tit'y REE tu'c óxpuintR nf theRr, mRppinqR. Rr.IRxinq thc RRRUmptiou of perfec:t forti
Right, I~:R(IR IIR to Rtudy RqcutR who fortn cxprctatiouR RdRptivcly. The iuformRtion Ret of
RqentR Rt thc bcqinninq of pcriocl t conRiRtR of thc entirc hiRtnry of priceR inclnclinq thc
currr,nt price: H, -{p,,...,p,}. In qenerRl, RqentR cru~ form tI1Gi CXp(:CtRtIODR VIA Rrly





Given R f.timily of expectatiouR functiouR F,, the IucRl RtRbility of the diffcrent REE cRn bc
clet.r.rmined. We will rc.r,trict. the ~IRRR of expactRtinu fimction IRter in thc pRINr to nllnw for
R murc tmrRimuniolur reprcw,utRtiou. Thc woRt promiucnt cxRUiplc uf dyuwuic modclR witó
nuiltiple REE iR the clnrR of L)LG modelR. Ituatetul of uRinq the gcucrRl model prcvtentcti
Ill t111R RI:('tloll, wc will cRRt thc rrxt of thc pnpcr in thc notation of OLG mcxielR Rincc thc
crnci~l iuqrccliRntR of the IeRrninq nileR crm be morc r.twily ctemonxtratecl in thiR notation.
J
3 An extended example: The OLG model
Wc xtudy a variRnt of thc. hasic SRmuclxon (1958) OLG (conmunption-IoRU) model, in
which thc moncy Rnpply may tx, incm.Rwx1 enrL perirKl to finRUm R cunwtRnt government
daficit. In thia eu.r.tiou, wc review the detRilx of the modcl in ordcr to Hx aotRtion Rnd
pmpcrtirR. Sec Azariadie (1t3tJ3) and SRrgent (1rJ87) for c,xccllent textbcwk trcRtmentn of
OLG modcls.
Thcre iR one perishable good in cRCh pericxi. Gcnr.ratione live twm perioda, Rnd Rtr.
indexed t- 0, 1, ... by thr, dRtc of birth. ERCh genr.ration rnnxintx of R siugle. RE;ent (or of
identical Rqentx who Rct identicRlly). Every gcneration t~ 0 hRe the wlme ntility U(cl,, ezl),
wherr. r.~, ;wd cZ~ Rro couenmption in youth Rud nld-Rqe, rratpectively, swd thc wune c.ndow-
ulcut c~ 1 0 suld ez ~ 0 in youth Rnd old-Rgc, roxpc.rtivcly.
I'orward contrsuute Rm nnt allmveci, xince it wonld reclnim trRdin~ betwcr.n Rgenta thRt
Rrc not a~ivr.. Howevcr, thcrc ie R storRblc Knnd callcd "moncy" that hRS no rnnxumption
vRlue. Iu yonth, Rgentx cRn chcxwlc. to trRCle pRrt of their endowment for money. In old-Rge,
Rgr.ntn supply thcir holding of moncy inclRSticRlly. NornuJizc thc pricc of moncy to 1, Ict p,
tx: the pricc of thc gonrí in lx~ritxi t, Rud Ict xl~~ - pl~~~p, tlc the inHRtion fRrtor in pericxi
tfl.
Wc ruutnmc that, when Rgentx trRde in thcir yonth, thcy form point exlxrtRtione Rbout
the prir.c in thc nr.xt period, in wayR yet to bc ecpeciRed. Given R current porinri pric.r. pt
Md R prICC f:XpMtRtlnD ]1~~~, (~(:nClAtlOn t C]N1f]fN~i plflnn(:d C(1rIR11mptlnn (c~l, r.zl) Rnd moncy
purchRrw~x ml ~ 0 in youth that enlvc
max U(c~l,r,21)
~~„~.,,m,
(7) Rubj. to: c.u - cl - ~n1~P1
c41 - e2 f n11~Pit1 -
Thcrc ia only onc degrr.r. of frrndom in this problcut. E.g., thc choicc of rnnsnmption in youth
detenniuex the moncy pluchRw~1 Rnd the plRnned conenmption in old-Rl;c. Ftilrthermore, the
optinull conmlmption levels depcnd only on the anticipateci inBRtion fsu:tor x~~l - Pif1~P1.
Let S(a~~~ ) be the net Hupply of the good in ynnth, Rs R functiou nf the exprcted inflRtion.
Then m, -PiS(xitt)-
Wc impoxc thc followiug avxnmptio[ut on S:
Aaeumption 1
1. S ie di,~r.mntiable.
2. S'(-) G 0.
3. Them ur A" ~ 1 exch thnt S(A") - 0.
Thc iv:onomic significRnce of tóc~c Rextunptionx ie Rx followR:
1. S ix diffcrentiablc nudcr atRndard diffcrr.ntiRbility and mne.RVity Rxxumptionx on U.
G
Z. S'(.) G(1 if c, wd r.z nrr. y,rruuc R nbxtitutrw.
3. a" is the imiquc mlative pricc that mipportx thc endowment. Wc axxnme a' ~ 1, and
henm S(1) 1 0 ~o thnt moncy irs nxcci in rrptilibrinm tn trxnxfcr conxumption from
youth to old xl;r.. Thie ie oftr.n crtllni thc "clswxicxl" o.rttw. Thix swxnmption holclx, for
exntnplc, if U ix tnonotour. nnd symmotric wtd r., ~ r.i.
Iw~t S(0) - lim,yo S(x). Then S:(0, x"~ -~ [0, S(0)) ix a diffcomorphiRm with inveree S-'.
The government ie~n~ new moncy óp, cru~h period t to piuchnxc é 7 0 unitti of thc
gcuKi, in order to Hnauce a rnnxtstnt reAl deScit. Such "inHntion tnxation" ia lrAx effi.r.tive
than direct tsucation; for exwnple, n~entx cxn never be worxe off thxa if they conmtme their
endowtncutx. Therefore, ó cxunot be too Inrge. We xtxte uow, once xnd for nll, that e.acL
rrx~dt in thiA papcr holcie for ê in rcom~ intcrvnl [0, b), xnd wc will not mpestt thia rrattriction
rsvch timr. a r~nlt ie stxted. However, for xomc rrac~tltx wc will expticitly neatume that á- 0
oró10.
In poriod L, genr.rxtion t- 1 enppliex itx moncy holdinp,e m,-, iuclnxticxlly. Hence, thc
total moncy snpply in pcriocl t ie:
(8) m, - m,-, t ëpi .
Thr, markr.t for money (nnd, by Walrax' Law, the mxrket for tho gorxi) clexrx when
(0) PiSÍxit~) - mi .
Iwa H, -{p,};-~ be thc hiRtory of pricex np through t. For given pruameterx á nnd
n~, wc ctui writc thc moncy aupply tw n fimctiou m, - M(Ni) of priccxt. Hencc, pricc
exprctsttions are silxo x functinn pit, -~~,(H,) of ptwt attci cnrrent prian t. Fix rw
expr.rtations ntlc P` -{~~,(H,)}~~. Subxtitutc mt - Mi(H,) wd Pi~, -~f,(H,)
intn the nuirket clenring conditiun (9), nnd Iet Pi(H,-,) be the xet of pricex p, for whicó
mnrketn clcar, ~IVCp H,-~. ~j(H,-, ) d~c;ribr.x the dyntttnic tmlutvior of the eytetem for the
expa:txtioux ntle P`. A price pnth Ha, -{p~}~t ix stn ~rlnilibrium I;iven P` if, for exrh t,
P~ E P~(H~-~ ).
lu thc nutarkic rquilibriutn, moncy ie expr.rteci to have no vnluc aud henrn hnn no vxluc.
Agr.ntx consnme thcir endowments nnd the gnvernmr.nt cartunt finance itai deScit. Our price
normulir.ntion dnrt, not xlbw ns to w~t thc pricc of moncy to zc.m, bnt we will wty that the
~v:ouotny is approximntaly in antnrky when a~~, .~: a".
For cach t, the demand for tho good by the ~overnment in ó aad the ~emxnd by thc
oldcr gencration itS atrictly poxitivc ( xince thcy havc moncy to trndc). Hence, a na:c~txary
condition for rRuilibrinm ie that S(x~t,) ~ ë, i.c., that ait~ G S-~(ë) ( for ó G S(0)).
'T6~- iu~~luxinn oI the carn~at prim io tbe informatioa rK3 can I~e de[eaded in at leaet two ways. Fitst,
yoaag agcuts kamv how mach money the old n~enta currcotly óold. They slso kaow tbeir owa [orecastinó
rnle. Henor they caa baclc out tbe enrrent equilibtinm price. Secoad, ageata oleo cna be allow~ed to use
[uaetional forecastr iastead o[ poiat [orecasts. Thue aseats caa coadition no tbe carrcat priee as uoted by
Marimoa and Snader (l~a).
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A price pat6 {p,}i-i ix xaid to hc 1 mtionnl exlx~ctntimu ryuilibrium (REEJ if it ix xn
crynilibrinm for thc expectationx rulc {lx~~(H,) - p,t,}. By xnbxtituting Péar - Prtr into
thc ntsu-ket-carstring eqnatiou (9), wc w.r that thc following two r~uatioux nutxt hold for cnrh
t:
(10) Pr-iS(Ar) - trt,-,
(11) PrS(~rtr) - trt,-i fp,Á
Combiuiu~; ( 10) ru:d (11) yirldx ( 12), :utd re.arrsut~;iug yicldx (13):
(12) r,-rs(A:) - nrs(~rtr)-nró
(13) S(xrtJ - S(~r)~~r f á .
Wc cnn rewritc (13) :tx:
(14) ~rtr - ~(A:) - S-r(S(~e)~Ar f ó) .
Thix ix valirl fnr a, E(~„~~"(ó) ~~""'lë)1, whcrc u"~"'(ë) - S-r(ó) nnd a~"~"(ë) ix thc nuicluc
xnlntion tn S(~)~n -F Á G S(0). Notc al~ that II'(.) ~ 0. Wc can find ratinnril cxpectatiotu{
equilibria by fixing pl :mc1 xolvinq
nxo
Pr -
S(xr) - á '
for ar, ancl thcn finding xnbxequcnt in8ation fartorR itr`rativcly by a,t, - II(x,), tw long trn
tr, E ( am~n(ó) trm".(Á)). Solvin~ ( 13) for xrt, given a,, nx long :w thr,rc ix xnch a xolution
with 0 G tr,tr G am"`(b).
Au cquilihrinw ix x:ud tu bc a elntimrnn~ REE if thc xrYlnettcr. {tr,t, ),-~ ix cotutant.
Frrnn ( 13), rw inHatinn fsu~tor tr ix n xtationary ItE inHatiou fnctor if :md rnrly if
(15) S(x) - S(n)~a f á .
If ë- 0, i.c., thc mnncy xupply ix cntutant, then cithcr S(a) - 0(i.c., a - ~r") or ~- 1.
For 6 ckuzr to Q there nrr, xtatiounry RE in9atiou fnctorx r'Icuu~ to 1 stnd a", rrx indicnted by
thc followiug propoxitinn:
Proposition 1 There nre À~ 0 nnd rnntinunsa fimctinnx a'(ó) nnd a"(ó) definr.d mt [0, ë)
.vuch tknt:
1. a'(ó) nnd a"(ó) atr xtntu~runi~ RE injintion jnctnrx.
~. a'(0) - 1 aud ~"(0) - ~rt".
:i. Fnr ê E (D, ë): 1 G ~rt'(ó) G x"(ó) G tra.
j. II'(a'(á)) ~ 1 mtd 0 G II'(ar..(ë)) G 1.
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Prtu~IP: Allply t.hc Implicit. [lluct.iou Thoor~~lu t~~ (IS), whicó wc rcwritr:w
Then
(1G)
f(x,d) - S(x)-S(x)~x-Á - 0.
`~f - S'(x) - s'(x)~x f s(x)~xz .~
Thc exiAtencc and propcrticA ( 1-3) of x' Rnd x" follow fmm:
(17) ~(1,0) - S(1) ~ 0 .
(18) ~(x",0) - S'(xa)(1 - l~x") G 0 .
Now fix d E[O, d) arlri diffcr~ntiatc (13) to fiud [I'(-):
S'(xlt,)r~xlfl - (s'(x~)Ixl - s(xl)Ix~ )~xl
1I'(x:) - (S'(x:)~x: - S(xl)~xi)~S'(x:tl) .
~rnn (1G) suld (17), wc havc:
S'lx') - S'lx')~x' f S(x')~x.z ~ 0
s'(x')Ix' - S(x')~x.z G S,(A.)
(S'(x')Ix' - S(x')l~.z)~S'(x') ~ 1 .
Thcrrfom, II'(x'(d)) 1 1. SimilRrly, (1G) Rnd ( 18) iu)ply that II'(x"(d)) G 1. C]
Marcet :md S:ugent (1rJ89) Aay that thc roulparativc AtatlcA of x' xrc "cIRRRICRI" br.-
cauAC a increaxe in the hnd{;et defir:it increaACA the AtRt10IIRry IURRtllln f.~r'tor, wherenA the
r'Om~aratlVr` AtatlfA OF 7r" arc "pr`rverAC" hr:(:R11A(; thl'. O{)~(M{ltC IA truc. F5lrthermore, notr`
thRt thc lower inflation faraor Pareto dominatrx the óigher inflRtiou faraor (by reveRlr~(i
preferencc).
ThcAC Atationary RE equilibriR with inflati~)n factorA x'(ó) and x"(b) will alAO bc Ata-
tiuu:uy ~~quilibria fur the uthcr expecttltiol)x rnleA we conAidr.r. Thc rcAt of thiA paper AtudieA
thcir lural ,tability Itudcr t.ho v:u~iunA exp~xa:ItinnA rnhxs.
Wc Aay that a Atatiolitiry RE inHatiou f.~trrc x iA (Irxrnllf~) xtnólr, if it iA a(locally) Atablc
fixed-point of thc dynarnic cquation xl}1 - CI(xi). Thr. loc~l Atahility pmperticA of thc
AtatiouRry REE follow froln II'(x'(d)) ~ 1 tu)d 0 G II'(x"(d)) G 1, in PrupoAition 1:
Corollary 1 x"(d) ix lr,rn[l,ry stnblc óut x'(ë) i.s not.
Furthcrmore, if x'(ó) arc the uniyur. Atation:uy R.EE in9Rtion fncto)n, then them arc no
eqnilihrinm pathA with x~ G x'(d) (Anch R path wo1Jd rlc(:reswe nntil x~ G xmin(d)) ~)fl
any equilibrilun path with xi , x'(d) convcrgcA mnnotouicRlly tu x"(ë). Hcucr., in :m
r.connn)y with pr,rfect forcAi{;Lt agentA, mruct price pathA will cmrvert;e to thc high intlation
REE whlw~, ccouomi~ prupcrticA arc nunAr,uAiclc.
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4 An example
In this rxrtion, wc introducr` A spcrial cwr that will appenr thmut;ho,lt thc rr~Rt of thc
plpcr. As.vnmc that S ix ul siffinc fimction,
S(x) - no -rxix ,
with rYO ~ rY, 1 0. (For examplc, U ix Cobb-Uonglnx wd el is en~ricntly Islrger thnn es.)
Then:
1. tr" - rro~rt, ) 1.
2. S'(~r) - - rr, G 0.
3. ~rm.,(ó) - (no - ó)~rYl.
4. ~rmin(ó) - (rxo f ó)~l rro f rYl ).
u. a'1'1(ó) -~no f al - ó f (~ro ~ rr, -) - 4aon,) ~2rr,.
G. II(nr) -(na i. nl - ó- rro~xi)~nl-
Notc that ( 15) ix qundratic, su,d ~r'(é) and a"(ë) nrr. thc only two xolutionx. Hcnm, thcrc
are uo othcr rctationr~ry REE inflation fnctorx.
If U(r.,,cZ) - c,r.2, thon S(tr) - (e, - r.zir)~2. vr' nnd ~r" arc Rhowu in Fi~llrc 1 for
e, - 2, r,2 - 1. Fi};nre 2 Rhowe II fnr thc~e pnrameter valucw rwd Á- O.M.
5 Price expectations
In thie sertion, we xtudy :ulaptivc r.xpectatione wherc the ~rICC CX~r CEAtIOn IR A WCI}~htl'.(1
avcragc uf ptuct pricex. If 6~ U, thcu bot6 atatiouary REE oquilibria havc monotonict,,lly
incr~~uing pricex wd are uot statiouary equilibria fnr snch ariaptive exprct.ntinna. Therefore,
wc a~sxnmc that ë- 0, R,i th~t thc luw-infintinn xt~tionary REE, whiró luw x ronntxnt prirc,
iR a xtationvy eqnilihriuul.
Whcu ó- 0, the mnrket rlenring eynation (9) becomex
(19) PiSÍPit1~P,) - mo .
The ,miquc Rnhltion whcn Pitl - P, iR
P' - n,o~S(1) .
Thin ix thc conxtaut prirc of thc etationary REE.
For tixed piil, PrS(Pit1~Pi) iR inrrr,.~rtiug, v,d hcuce thcrr, ix a tsnlntion to (19) ~ Inng sw
thc mwcilnum valuc of p,S(Pit1~P,) ix nt Ir.s,xt nb. For fixM1 p,, P,SlPiti~Pr) ie rtc.r.retwing
in p~t,. Themforc, thr. rx,t of p;t~ for whirh thcrc ie a xohltion ie an intcrval (ji;~l, oo). For
hxeri p,~l iu this intervsJ, PiS(Piti~Pr) ie atrirtly inrrerwing in p, or ix negfltive. Hence, thc
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xolntion to ( 19) ie uniquc. Dcuotc thc xclhltion by P(p;ti). By diffcrr.ntintiug ( 19), onr, cxn
vcrify that P' ~ 0
Siucc P(.) is incrcaxinK, Pif1~Ps G 1 if and ouly if Pi~~ ~ p'. Hcucc, PlPitl) iR ~
increnrsinq fswction that crnr~a the 45' line at P~, ml~ PitljP(Pitl) couvergrx to x" aR
Pit l ~ ~. In snmmruy:
Proposition 2
1. Fnr cxtchP~~l thcrr is n euliqrur s)nbdiml P(Pi~~) tn n~ - tne(PLPift)-
2. P ie r.rmtinunuv and Atrir.tl~ inr.mnxing.
3. Thr, etntinnnr7~ mmir.tnrr~ r7uiliórium pricr p' ix tlu~ uniqeur fisrr! pnint nj P.
~. lÍPitl ~ P, thr.n P~ G P(Pitl) G lifl-
5. !f Pitl G P~, thr.n Pitl G P(Pitl) G P-
G. lim"-.a P"(P) - P~ Ínr nil p 10.
For ex:unple, if S(sr) - cro - cr~a, thr.n P ix linenr, 1nd P(Pì~l) - (nb f crlPifl)Ino.
Th:~ w~natiou uf mnt.iuu for thc [tEE iK p~ - P-' (p,-1). F~om the propr.rticx nf P, wc ~an
ru.r. thxt if p, 1 li , thcu thr. patL incmruv~l wouotaluic:Jly :wd thc iuH:~tinu fslctnr convergcxt
mountonically to A'. Thcrc ix uo sx~uilibrinm pnth with p~ G p', bca-nnrx~ thc pnth would
d:.rmswc mnuotonicnlly until thcrc iR no r~uilibrium. Hencc, p' iR mixtnblc, xttd xl! otóhr
~uilibrium convcrgc to sutnrky.
Howevcr, when pricrR s~re pr(:dICtC(Í nx thc nvcrs~ye nf p~t pricex, thc dynxmi~ arc
invcrted. Thix ie thc mntst obviolus if wc lnnk at thc ruiaptivc nilc
(20) ~Pltl - Ps-1 .
Then, atlrting with n pricc expcrtntinn p2 - po, wr, got pl - P(pz). Thie thcu bc.romc~
thr, next price expectation, :uid sus pz - P(p~) - P~(po). For nny f. ~ 1, p, - P`(po)
wheresw with perfrct forrxight expectatiocui pi -(P-' )'(po). Tilc utcxlcl htw the w~uic
Ktntinuary ainilibri:~, bnt thc Ktahlhty IR n1~1 CnvcrxMl. Mrla:t pnths convcrgc tn p', swd a
singlc pcrturbation froul thc sutsarkic c~c~uilibrium begius u~th rnnvcrKing to p'.
This rr`xult cnn be qencralizrví. Suppruto that s~r.nte form pricc expectatione using a
fimctinn P,`t ~(. ) of Pxxt pric~l. Wr, impn~ only n fcw amalc propcrtisx on F;`f ~.
Assumption Z Them am0 G pl C pT r~arh thnt P;~~ lir.s in the r.mnrex Mal! nf {pl,pT, pl ,..., pl }
fm~ a!l t.
Aasumptioa 3 Fnr nlt K C Rt nnd T~ 0, ij p~ E K jnr n!l t 1 T, thr.n the durtnnr.r.
e!( ~~ ~( p~,..., p~ ),K) brrlvMen the prirr r.xprctntinn nnd K cnnnr.rrteA tn zem.
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Anothcr wxy to etltc thn Axxnmptiun 2 iv that thc thc pricc expw~tntiuu licac betwcr.n
the hit;h~ext .ws1 lows~t luuct pricn; ( IIlf.hllilrl~ Jrl :wd pT). Auy ndc f.h:rt evcutnally w,ta
the price exlN.rtation tvlqtJ tsl x couvex comhiusrtiou uf pnrviolw pria~R twd previolus prim
exprrtationR, and ucvcr w~tx the pricc exlxx~tsltion tn (1, Rrltisfi~ Awlrunption 2.
Adxptivc rlilc (20) satisfi~w 1)1)th F17ittlllnOLIIInR, :w do~ the nclxptivc rula luu.rl iu Lncm
(l~J8f,),
(21)
1 - 1r'-' 1 1 1} t-1 1
1~i F i t,-o P. - t PF -1 t Pi
ruld thc followiug nrlr,:
1'-' 1 t-1
(22) Piai - ~ ~P. - ~P)-i -} ~Pi ,
.-o
with p" ~xogenouR.
Propoaition S Undr.r A.rAUmptinru 'l nnd 3:
1. lim~-,a P: - P .
2. IIPl ? P' imAP., PT C P~, Lhen p~ ~ p' (rr.xp., PF C P'i ~nr nl[ t.
.?. IjPi~~ dorv not d~Prnd nn pe, thrn thrrr iR n unisJltr r.qrtilihrinm.
PROOF: Wc begiu with two Icuunsw.
Lemma 1 Undr.r AAAUmpti~m 3, if therr nrr 0 C Pl C PT xr~rh thnt Pl C P~ C PT Íor
ntl t, then lim~-,a - p'.
PROOF: Snppcl~ that
lim iuf p) ~ Pl xud lim euppi C pT .
1-~00 l-,or.
Lhou Awomuptiun 3 ilnplicx that




Thcrofom, eincr. p~ - P(Pi f i) nud P is ~~outinnons nud strictly iucn~neing,
liu) iufp, - lirn iufP(fi~~~) ~ P(pl))ym I~n.
lilu xnpP~ - iiul ecnp P(Pi~ i I 5 r(PT )
)~R. 1-.T.
By iudnctiun ou n,
lim inf pF ~!'"(pl) tuld lim eupps C P"(PT)FyK, 1~~
ft)r .~II n. Siuce linl„-,.,~, P"(P) - P~ for sdl p 1 11, IimP, - P. O
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Lemma 2 Uurler AxHUmptimt 2,
win{li ,pl} G P~ C mnx{P',PTÍ
jrn~ rttl l.
P200F: Suppr~ thstt mnx{P~,Pi-~} C tnauc{p',pT}. E.q., this ie trivisdly tntc if
t- 1. Theu either Pit: C P ~~ óence p, C p', or p~ G Pi~i. lu the latter cwu~,
Axrsumptinn 1 implirxr tLnt,
Pub: 5 utnx{PT,Pi,....Pr} -PT .
Eithcr way, p~t~ G msuc{p',pT} nud pr C innx{p',pT}. By inductiou, thix ie tntc for
all t. A eimilAr str},ntment shows that p~ ~ min{p',pl} for xll t. ~
Nnw wc contpletr tho prvxd uf the pruprucitinu:
1. I.emma 2 impli~ thnt tltc rondition in Iw~mmx 1 iR xxtie6Ml, :utd hentr, lim,y,oP, -
P-
2. If Pl ? P (rrRP., PT C P), then Lemma 2 implirR that p, ~ P (~P., Pr 5 P')
for sJl t..
3. [f f~t~ drx~ uot depcud nu pr, the :Yp:ilibriitm iu ew-ó lxerind ir; detertnined
ultiqur.lY hY P: - P( rit: (' )) ~td price expa'tiLt111DA ;~re t.hcu nniryucly Áetrr-
miur~l hy p:uat pria~. Hcucc, thcrc caw bc only our rrpiilíbrimu lutth. (If
Pia~ ~Iclx~nds uu pr, then p~ ie ou buth t6r~ Icft swd rigLL xidc uf the atnation
Pr - p(~~: (P: ,..., Pr )) . ~~ thcrc rntild bc nmltiplc ecolutionx.)
O
TLc iutuition of thix rrx:dt is ra; followe. Prirtx c:ut nuly inrreswc i[ prim exl~~txtions
are incrcawiuq stx wr.ll. Siuce :y;euts Averaqe pwst pric~ to fonn their exlx.rtatirnu of next
Iteriud's price, thcy will exprY~t pricrx do go rlown eveu nftr~r the prire óax ritx~n iu the P:txt.
TLus pricrs c:u:uot. ritr futr.vcr xnd inHatiou hsw tu couvcrqe to nnity.
6 InHation expectations
Forminq prirc exlx.rtntiaus nxiug a liucru~ cmnhiuntimt of luwt prircx hmv :uttnc rnneíri-
crxhlc rfrawbrtrkn. Suppruu~ thnt prireR have ix.r.u 'turrestxiuq Rinre thc initinl ~rirxl. Then
:wy expcrtatirin formMi ru~cordinq to a nJc euttiKfyiuq tuwiunptioux 1:wd 'l will prrYlirt that
prir~ will qo rlown ucxt pr.rirxi. Hcur.c, ry;cut.~ r.xprrt deHntinu dexpitc thc fnrt that them
h:w Ix.r.u prw~itivc inflntiuu iu :~I pmviorur pcrirxla. Thirs nuwstixfsu~t~~ry clutrnrtcriwtic ctut
Fx~ nvuirlcd if sytcutx uxr luwt. inHntiou ratr.~ tu fortn futnm pricr exlxrtntionec. TMw thix
w.rtiou Ntnriirx r.xlH.rtationx rnlrar thxt forerswt thc injtntimt jar.tar sw :ui stvernqe of luwt
la




p,Sl~~t,) - tn,-~ f p,h
I3:.rauw~ wc arc awrnming that a~~~ ia a fnnction ouly t:f luwt aud c:u7cut inHation fw-torr.,
rathcr tL:ut of thc ah:udutc pricc Icw~l, wm can combiuc (23) and (24) :utd reattangc to
nbtaiu:
(2J) S(xé)
x~ - ( ~S tre} ~ ) - Á .
We axxnmc that a conetant inflation Bu~tor Ic:ulx to the xamc expirtMl int}atiou fsu~tnr.
Henrn, thc stationary REE inflation factaire sur at.c:uly-states nf (25).
I3~~fur~~ :~uu~idcriuy; iuurc t;~,ucral fnuctiuu:J funus uf forminti extay~tad.iu:w uf fntnrc in-
Hatinu r:~x, wc st:vt. wit.ó twu :,z:wipl:~ wóich w:dcc 1.6c lu:xic wcchswisiu clcar. Wc umit.
thc pr:~dre nt LItiK st:y;c siu:~:~ Lh~~y :u':~ j:uit sp~N~i:J c:uur uf Lhc pr,qNrciti::ux wl:it'h nrc pruwvl
IaG~r iu Lhir ~~rt.i~:u. lu thc tirrsL example, ry;culse uw~ Lhc rnnrhtt iuNttl.iun raU~ :w ex1Nx't3o-
Li::ur::d Llic uexl. IH,riud'x iullal.iun. 'I'hc w~:~un:l ~,x:wy:lc npw,ili~~x iu8al.iuu cxlNy~faitinux :us
l:urt pcrial'x m:Ji~~yi iuHatiuu. Hcucc, t.hc uuly ililfcrcua~ in thc datiut; uf rc:diiad iuNatinu
whirL is uravl to funn expa~tationr. It tarti.Y unf. f.h:d. thir timiuti ix a crucial eletltent fnt'
liu-:d stadiility nf thc RE ~r~iiilibria.
Example 1: nf~, - n,
Thc law of motion ('l5) bc~~uwr.x:
x:(SI~;)-h) - SI~:-~) .
~dx: S (A;-i)
dtr;-i - Slx;) - h f A:S'(x;) ~
At a, - a,-, - x..1h), fur h~'buu~ to i.~ro:
(2S)
:la, S,(tr") - l~a" G 1 .
,ia, , ~ ,r~S'lx,~)
Hru~'c, t.hc óigh-intlal.inu xG,:uly Ktatc, a"(~S), iK lu~'ally etablc.
At a, - tr,-, - a'(h), for ó cln~ to ~.em:
du, S'(1)
,hr,-; - S11) f S'(1) '
Hencc, if S(1) C-2S'(1), a'(ó) is not lor.:dly stablr.. For cx:unplc, if fl(c,,cZ) - c~cz,
thr.n a'(6) iR nnt locally Rtahlc if e, G 3cz.
1 ~1
Exarnple a: a,al - x,-1
Slq)poRC instr`:ui tl]Rt x;}, - a~-1. Tllcu (2J) I)IV'OIIIIeR;
( ~) I(x1,Re - i,A,-s) - n,(S(x(-1) - ó) - Slx,-r) - tl .
llRiuti R liw::u~iraa furm wc rsw sóuw tl]c fulluwiu{;:
a" iR IucsJly Rtnblc if -S'l 1) G S(1). In p:u-ti(~nl:u~, if sr' iR IocsJly RtRI)Ic wóen
;ri~l -~re, tócu ar' iR lucRlly Rtable when a;ri - a,-1. Fur exvuplc, S(a) - rra - rt~sr,
t.lu~u a' iR luc:dly Rl.:rblu if (r(~ G 'lrrl. If U(ri,r.e) - rirl, tócu a' iR luc:dly nuxtnblc if
ci G lcl. A" iR lur~;llly nuatablc
TLiR twu cxrwlpleR rictnuuatrRtc thRt it. iR crnci:J for tllc Rt:]bility :wsJyxiR óuw thc
dnting uf the arlaptive expertntiou foruultiuu iR Rp(:r:iH(~d. If RgcutR xre sJlowerl ta, nRe
current. infonnntion, tl)en tLe hiqll inHRtiou crplilibriulu a" tendR to bc Rtnbla If Rt;entR
sve rextricted to only uR(~ inforlnatiuu np to lrerirxl t- 1 thcu x" iR Iuc:Jly lu]RtRble. Tllc
Rtability nf thc low inHntiuu (vplilíbrinln iR uut :w (-Ic:u- rllt. lu luu~ticnl:]r, RtRI)IIIEy detNl]dR
on tIIC RIIRI)C bf tI)C CXC.(!riY Rnpply filuctinn S. Huwever, if a' iR Rtnbl(, wh(~u ouly IRg};ed
iufnrlu:d.i(,u iR nRrvl, thcu it. will :JM, be Rtnbl(r wl,cu cnrrr.ut iuHRtinu rRl.rx Rre inClu(icd.
'fóc r~,vl~rw~ iR u„t. t.rn(~. Mnrimun :wd Slludcr ( I!)'J:S) I,uiut uot tós]t tóc iur-luniuu uf r~urrcut.
infurlu:d.ion Ilul-. uol. IuRkc R,IiIG~r,~n(~c fur Rt.:J,ilit.y wllcu a~rrnl.R forr~(.:wl. lu.i(~(~ IcvelR. TlliR
rcRUItR iR (~nutiruled Ly uur Prop(n(itiun 3. Howevcr, suc the exsuupky. Róuw thc ILCIIIRIOn
of c,u,v,ur. iuf(,nnntiou iu tóc iufonnatiuu ru,t. rirN~ lunkc a cnx~isJ rliffarencc wóen sal;cutR
funY-:~Yt. inllat.i~,u rat(r.
Th,: t.wo I.x:uuplcR su~c cxpccta]ti(,uR rul(~1 wi1.L RLort wewury. lu ut.ócr wurdR, tllc suiR}r
tive expectatinnR forn)ntion only depenrlR eitLr.r on curreut iuflnt.iuu ur uu uue period In~(xl
inflntion. InHRtion IRggcri morc thsu] unc pcriod iR uut. iuclndcrl. Tl]iR will bc gcucrRlizcri
uext. It tnruR ont tl)nt it. iR luurc cunv(,uir,ut to uw~ a rl~(~nrRivc furulnlat.iou inclnrliuf; 1r.rRt.
exprr,tcrl iuHsltinu iustcRrl psuct ul,RCrwYi inHRtiou dircctly. f3ut if. Rllwdd bc Rppsur.ut. t.hxt
t111R RI)C(71HC.ntIO[1 IR fnirly gcuersrl su]d sIIOWR for tl]c cutirc Lixtory of ulxu~rvr.ri luu:t. iuHR-
tion tu bc mlev;u)t for r.xpr.cts]tirnl forn]Rtiou. Thc ucxt two propr,rcitiun n.w: n exlHrtntiouR
Rpc(~ificatiou whicl] iR timc-iuvariwt, LC. tIIC Elln('t111[IRI frlrtn IR Cr1URt:NIt IIVCr Elnll`, TIIIR IR
Rulucwhnt n~Ntrictivc :w,l will bc t;Irucr:Jizcd IRtcr uu.
WI~ (~unnirlcr expcr~tatinu ti,rmst.ion uf thc folluwiuti 6a~m:
(31) x~tl - F l x,, xi ) .
Th(~ Hlwt cx:unplc ~r~~l - x, iR R Rp(v-isJ rnw~, suld wc fiud tllnt om~ rcRall.R fur thiR c:~w~ csw
bc };cucr:afir~ed. A w~(~uud r.xswlplc iu tLiR clslxc iR thc r~unxtnnt gnin nprlRtiu}; known iu thc
RtOfh:LRtl(' ill)hf,lxlll)Rt1011 IitcrRtnrc:
(3'2) aitl - ( 1 -rr)ar~ .}rra(
(a3.i) - 7r~ f rk(A~ - xt ) .
wit.h 11 G rr G 1. 1~IIC iut.uitiou iR t6:d. I:ucl. pcriwl~N 1'XINrt:rtlllluc:u~c uprlutiut; iu tllr, rlirvxtinu
of thc Iswt obRCrvatiou. T6c npdatiug ratc (r detrn~luiu(~x by huw Inur-6 thr, exlm~tsltiuuR arc
IJ
:uijuxtrYl. Hcrc it. ix aax~unrrl to IN r~opxttuit. Wc will cnnxidcr tlic rlcrscruiiug gain, wóem a
ix drrm.~r.iuti with t, LLtcr. Fur t4c t;encrnl fnnn (Sl ), wc :wx~uuc tLnt tlic 1KLrtial dcrivativex
:Lrc (runt;hly xpc:Lkiuq) bctwrs~u 0:wd 1, whir~li acxcut.i:Llly nu,wx tLxf. f.Lc r~xlxrtatiruix v'c
revixrYl uut, tuu urncli. (n uthcr wurrLv, ucxt lr~rirKl'x expa~taLtiuux lic 6N-:JIy in tlLC r:onvex
hull of t6ix pcriod'x cxprrtationx ruid thix prriad'x rrl~rwrl inHntirlu. Thix ix muiiniw~ent
of thc rnnvox hull aecnumption in thc previoitx w,rtion.
Propoeition 9 Av,rnmr.:
1. u;t~ - F(~r,~; ).
2. F ia r:mdinumaxl~ diffcrrrntiablc, nritlL
0 C óF~órr~ G 1 nnd (1 ~ 8F~r3~r~ C 1.
:L a- l~ (a, a) jnr rdt a.
Then jnr Á r.lnae to ónt grrntr.r than zern, ir" i.v 4x:nll,ry xtnblr!. FxrtlLCrnLmr, ij
2F,(1,1) (-SI1)l GIfF,-I1,1),
` S(1)1 '
tlu~u x' ix lrxnll,ry HtaGlr jnr ë rtaxc tn zem.
PROOF: R.r.c~ll that thc Ixw of motiou for th~e a~uurmiy ix
51~~)
~~t~ - ( ~Sx,ti)-rS
Snlmtitnts tLe Inw nf mutiun iuto (31) ra~ get n firxt:orrler diffemuce cqnation for x~ :
Il~~ri~Á~) - x~ti-F~ (51~~) x~~-11.S aiti)-~
Tlrcu a, --t n iF :uid ouly if Á~ ~ a:Lnd thc xteruly xtxt~x uf j:Lrc thr~ xta~auiy xtrLtr`x of tóc
law uf motion fur ar. To clurk local xtxhility, wc rompr(tc thc dcrivatiw~x uf j at thc xtc:uly
xt:Lt~x:
S(xr)S~Ixttl)
I,.;,,I~~.~.R~) - 1fF,,(x~,x~) (S(A~,~)-6)~,
Í.~(~~ti,~~) - -F,,(a~,n'~) ~,(~i'~) -F;(A~,x~l-S rr'~4i)-~
Couxiricr firxt. tlLC xtability of a' witli À- 0:




dx,.~ - Í.,~,(1,1) - F,(1,1):s~~i } F;11,1)
dxi L,(1,1) F,,(1,1)t,(i~fl
Hcncc, the derivntive nf x;~~ witó trsprct to xi ie Irvw thwt oue iu sttbudute vxlno, implying
kK:~l at.lóility, if wd only if
-1-F,- G2F,,(1,1)S'(1)
' S(11
Notc, that thr. exvnpln stndicci IN~forc, x~~ ~ - xr, ie jturt n e~cial csnu~ with F,(1, 1) - 0
anri F,~ (1,1) - 1.
Now, cun:aidcr thc stsshility uf x". Wr, rrnvtricG onr xttcutiuu t.rr b ~ 0, IN.rsuurc uf rurute
sintindsu~itics; in thc rYlusttionx fnr b- 0. At x- x"
(34) dx~ti jx~.~(x~ x~~) F~(x~ ~x~~)..i.~x~ ~e
f F,~ (x' x")
dxi -- j.; (x. ,x..) - F.,(7r, x„) x~~~ f 1 ~L~tsr"1 h)
For ë claw~ to zero, S(x") - ë ie clruw~ to ~am, wtd hence both numerat.rtr swd denntniufltor
dw' ,
su-c ncgativc. Thns d~ G 1 if sutd unly if
F (x.. x..)
- 1 ~ (F ( S(xx.)
)Sbx..)I
`S(x(~).) b
- 1) - Alb)Q(b)-
Siucc S' G 0 smd F,,, (x", x" ) ~ 0 smd IKrth strc boqndecl ~ws;y frotn zero, we have
liut~-,o AIÀ) - -x,. Fhrthenuurc
S(x..(b)) S,(x..(b))x..~16)
~iy'ó S(x..l b)) - ë -
Ftnó S,(x..(b))x..,(ó) - 1
1 1
frutu ( 1G). Hcncc liwstio I3(b) ~O :wrl liut~.,o A(b)D(ó) ~-x,. Thas x" iw Ir~r:Jly ,astble
for azmstll prxisitivc b. O
Thc fuHowing prnpr,Kitiou ~howh that thc ststbility of x' sutd x" :uc rr.vcrw~ri if ngents
nsM lnygrd iuHation iust.t`su1 uf cunrut iuHatiou iu tLcir furecswtiu(; rnlc.
Propexaition 5 As:nmte:
1. x;tr - F(xr-t,x~).
~. F ix cmdinuna9l,y dijjrn~ntinLlc, xrith
0 G BF~íhrr G 1 nnri U C OF~r~tti G 1.
.?. x- F(x,x) jrm rill x.
Thcn jor b r.loAe tn Aut .qmnter thnn zr.m, x" i.v la~nll~ nnstnbfe. FirrfJtcrntmr;, ij
S(1) ~ -S'(1) ,
thrn x' iy lravdl~ xtnblr jor ó rIOaC f.n nr crpud to zrto.
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PrtooP: Agaiu, xubxtitut.r the law nf motion iuto thc farcrmtint; rnlc. Thix yicldx a xrrond-
ordcr diffcrenm ccputtion:
Í(~i,x~-:,~~-z) - x~ - F(S(xi-z)IlS(x~-i) - ó),xi-;) - 0
Thc partisJ dcrivxtivc.x strc
I,; - 1,
I,;-~ - F,,-,1.,.)S(x1-z)S~(~~-')-F~(-,J,(S(A~-~ ) - ó)z
S~(~~-z)1.;-, - -F,-,(.,.)(S(x~-J-a)'
whcrc F,,-, :wd F,~ nrc thc luvcirdx af F.
Cnuxider tt' with ë- 0. The chxrarterixtic alnxtiou for tlte diffr.rcur~e cquxtiau IinenrizMí
arr,unri thr. str,ruiy xtntr, x' ix
xz-f(-r.-F.(1,1))zfc,
whcrc c --P,,-, (1, 1)S'(1)~S(1). It ix r.ttxily chrrkr,d that thc rautx s~rc lic itutide f.hc unie
rirclc if anrl only if
-S'(1) C 1.
S(1)
A ximilar rtrtintment :w iu thc prouf nf thc previoiw prnpra~ition xhowx th:~t x" ix nnxtxblc
faró~0. O
Thexc rr~ultx h:wically xhnw thut rexnltx of thc xiurplc ex;uuplr~ cuuxirleretl enrlicr hold
fur murc };cucr.J ~~xpr~ctatirnr xlx~r-ific:rciuux. oucc :rt;r,utx :u'c :Jlawrxl tu nru, cnrrcttt iufuc-
tuntiou iu their expr.rtation nde, the higó iuHutiuu rxlnilibriutu G,urlx Gr IH~ xtablc rutd the
low iuHxt.iou equilibrinm ix Icxx likcly ta bc xtublr~. Notr, thnt thcrc ix uo olrvionx M:anamic
juxtifiaation why lgentx xhonld be excludrYl frntn uxinq curmnt inHntiou to forcrnxt Ax it ix
in principlc iu thcir infonuatinn xet.
Thc followint; two proparsitioux arc couccrurvl witó fnuctinunl fornw fur exl~tntiou for-
iu:d.iun whirh :ur, alluwal Lr, bc t.iwrr-vnryiut;. 'I'hix ix iwportwt. iu arrlcr to xllow decrr~ruting
gain or utore geuet:ll vmiaAlc gaitt xprritic~tioux. We ma{u~ xiutil:u. ruunuuptinnx abaut the
forrraxting rulr, w; beforc. Wc t;xr~ thc uotatiou F` for thr, fon.r.:wtiut; rnlc nxrY1 in pcrirxl t.
Assamption 4 Thr, famil~ nf fitnctian.4 {F'(T,,y)}~-~ hav thr. fotlmrring pmpr.rtiex:
~. F`(T.,7~) -~ F(2,7~) a.9 t-i OG, dT.~t~
2. F' ix catttinumtxl,y difj'emntiaAle Vt, vrith
U G aF`~8tr, C 1 anrt 0 C t~F` fátr~ C 1.
:l. a-!'"l~,a) forulla,t.
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Thc Rt.ability of a' iR urlt affrrtrYi hy thrwr~ chrutglers, Ro wc will fM~nR uu thc Rtability of
u". Thc next propnRition iR Rlightly diffcrent in Rpirit fmm thc prcrc.rliul; uuc. Herr, w~ Bx
thc dcficit b at a mrtain Icvcl and vary thc pnrtial derivativr~ of F ovcr timc. It tunut ont
that if the partial wit6 reRprct to a, iR gr`ttin~ RuuJl enongh aR t qrowR, thcu x" brcomr~
I(N'Ally I1nRtabl(`.
Pcopoeltion 8 Axsnmr! in nrlditinn to AxAnmption ~:
1. n Jixed b 1 0
;L. a;t1-F`(A:,xé).
J. 3T : F;,(~rt",a") G-.~-j~.~s:x~.~ Vt ~T
Then a" ix lnrnll~ unxtnAlr..
PROOF: Ii.~call (34). Thetr thn argnmcnt waR that we cau churw~ 6 Rmall ennugh Ro that.
that thc wmlcrator vid denomiuator nre netiative. With fixrvl b wlrl F;~Ix".x") xmall
cuml(;h, tltc dennmitlator iR IHUlitivc. Hence thc Rtability conditiou rcverwh the Ri);u. lt iR
crwily c~hc,~kcrl tlutt thc t~onditiun iu thr. pruprwitiou givr. thr. uppcr buaud of F;~(x",tr")
frn~ thiR to óappen. ~
An examplc iR
tré}1 -(1 - rr,)tr; } rY,x, with rYr ~ 0.
When rr, - I~t next period'R expcl~tatian iR jnxt the xvcrxgc rlf all IHUCt al~rvnï iuHatiou
rateR. Note that thr`RC Rprv:ificationR put Ir~ wei(;6t on curcent intlatiou a, :md more wcight
on a; :~ t growR. If the weight on tr, bcromeR Rmall enou);h, theu tr" br.r.omrxt Incally
IulRtabla ThiR iR iutuitivc aftcr rrcrJliu}; prnpoRitiouR 4 Imd 5. Tltem it wtuc Rhown that thc
wcight which iR pnt on n, iR cnlcial for Rtability of 7r". Thr, ncxt pru(xmitinn makeR thiR
clc:u. It. RhowR that if thr, dcrivativc of F' witL rrxtpr.rt to a, iR bunudryi :a~lvc 0 for all t,
then wc r~:ul find poRitive ricbt IcvclR for which a" iR Ir,ca~ly Rtahle.
Proposition 7 AxKnmr in ndditinn to AAAUmpf.iou ~:
1. ttitl - F~(A:~xi ).
"l. 3T:F,;,lx,,a~)~rY~OVt7T
Then 3ë ~ 0 R1{('.h thnt tr" ix lncalltl xtnóle fnr al! 0 G b C b.
PROOP: TLc pruuf iR r~RRr,uti.Jly thc Rsunc aR thc prllllf fur proplrRitiuu 4. Sini~c F;~1A„x")
iR huuudnl alrovc 0, wc ag:uu c:m Hud Ruudl cuuugh dcbt IcvclR ë wl Lhat f.hr.
uatuc~,lGlr
:uul dcuuwiuatur :ur. butll uc};ative. Then the rext uf the proof ix
:uudo);nuR. O
]9
An example iR a ricrrca4ing qsun appmximation whclr thc wcit;ót Iru ~tl riltrx nrlt qo to
zet'Ir
u1}1 -(1 - rrr)sr~ f ry~srs with rrs ~ rr ) U,rrrtl ~ rrl .
The hottom line of thiR Rcrtion iR tcl Rhow that hK~al Rtahility of ratintud ex{rl.rtntionR
equilibria luldcr sulaptivc Icnrning will in gencral detx~nd very much nn the exsl~t form óow
aciaptivr. explrtationrs arr. Rprcitir.rl. Thc rt~lultae csus h~ very Rensitive to certsun ingrr`tlienta
of thc Icsu~ning ndc. TLiR iR tnsc ev~u for Icarnia{; R{m~ifir'xtionR which óavc tsmu Rtullini
r.xtenxivcly iu thc literaturc. Prolwrbly thc m1iRt known :uisqitivic exntrtatinn ndc iR ordinary
Irsut-w{n:u'eR (OLS) Icaruiug, Rm c.};. Marcet. suld Ssu-gcut (198Jx,L,c). Thcy óavc Rhowu
that when pcrind-t a{;cutR uRC sul OLS regrrwRion ou 1Hwt pricl~l inl~larlin~ oluuervationR np
t.n t- 1, th~u x' IA RtiLhIC iLll(~ 9r~~ IR IlnRtal)IC. LI (Illr IlUtatt011 WC Can WCIt(` thlR t'.í{R(: aR
~~-Y PsP.-1
~l}1 - ~1-11,-1 ~
~ 2 1
which is eRReutially a Rlxrial eswe of propcmition 5. AR we have Rhown, it iR cnlr'ial fisr
Rtahility whether dato-R information iR included. ThiR iR alRO the c..1RC Lerr.. T6nR the
reviRed fllrcrastin{; rnle blv~omeR
.-zN.V.-1~1
At}I - ~1 ~
.-2 ~I - 1
W)111~1 c'all bc rr.written aR
~i}1 -(1 - rrl)a; f ns~rl with rY, ~ ir ~ 0.
The wcightR rx, and n are implicitly Ilefinal by the OLS retirreRRion. Hencr. it iR a R{sl.rial 1:~
of propoRition 7 aud thcrr.forc a" iR locally Rtablc for Rmall r.nough ë. Anothcr sdtcrnativc
OLS 1csuYSin{; Rpecification iR tu Ict agentR run a regreRRion of pswt. iuHation rateR on a
conRtsuit:
(1 - t) 1
~i}1 - ( ~i f ~ ~1 ,
which iR a Rpeci~l caRC of propasition 6. ThnR x" iR IrNal)y unRtab)a In otól~r worciR, Rtability
of REE dependR vcry nmch on how thc suiaptivc r.xplrtatiouR su'c Rpecihlvi. Diffcrcut OLS
rc{;reRRionR lesuí to riiffemut Rtability pro{mrtirxc. Tablc 1 Rnmmarii,rx~ thc reRnltR Rtlxíinl in
tlnR RI:1'tllln.
7 Relation to expectational stabiGty
A different hut clnRCly related con .m.pt nf sulapt.ive lau'uin{; ix thslt of explrtartionsrl
Rtability (or E-Rtahility). Urigiu:dly de6nMi by LncnR (1978) smd DI.C:wio (1sJ79), it hsw
bccu Rtudilvl r,xtr.neively by EvanR (198fi, 1989) alul Ev:wR attd Hnukapohja (19J'l, 1~J3,
1~J4ah, I~J5). Lutesui uf Ic:u'niug the pricc or iuHatinn ratc liirn~ely, ~Rtsthility defiucR
a Icslnsiu8 proceRR Im thr. law of nsotion of the ecuuulny. Intnitivoly, it. wurkR nR follows.
luit.i:dly agcutR plwRlnw a givnn {~rreiwxl law uf uiutiou. URing thiR 1N~recIW.vI IaW of UlOtloll
thcy gcncratc data whicó c:w hc nR1Yi to npclat.~ thc pcrcciwxl law of motion. UtK1er ccrtain
'l0
x! fl 9r~ RtRÍ)II:! x~~ RtRI)11.'I
x,t, NO YES
x, S(1) ~ -2S'(1) YES
x,-, S(1) ~ -S'(1) NO
F(x,,xi)
z~..s,~., 1 )-1-F,-(1,1) YES
F'(x,,x~),F;.enu111 zr~„(,.1 s (u~~ 1-1-F;.(1,1) NO
,( , ) , ~
F x,, x, , F,. I:u. ~, zr„tl,l)~ (n ~ -1 - F;,(1,1).. ~ YES
F(x,-,,x'i) S(1)~-S'(1) NO
OLS(P:-~.-.,P~1} YES NU
OLS(P,, .., P, ). MAYDE YES
OLS(x,, .., x, )~ YES NU
otc: ~ vttlid only for liuesu' luodc
Tntn.l? 1. S~numnry
rnuditions it caa bc Rhnwu thnt thie Irrtirning prrx:aw convcrg~ to tllc trnc Inw of uwtion.
In otócr wordx, thc nonlinenr map from tóc {NrmivMi Iaw nf rnotion t.r, the sualuJ law of
motion liru: Iw nxympt.:~tic,Jly xtnble 6xrYl }xriut. If this ie f.hr. ctu:c tllcu tllc pnrtll'Itliir IAW
uf uwtiuu ix t-:dlal cxpa't.iou:dly .rt.:dllc (,rc E-krarblc). (~:utrnry tu tlu~ :ul:yltivc Ic:vuiu};
etudi~.ri prr.viouxly, thiA hasruiug itsrntiou takrs pl:u.r. iu fictitiona timc. Thc concr.pt of
E-etability can be ularci tn Rtudy stRbility nf R.E equilibria iu OLG modcls. T6e rnndition
fur E-starbility iu tllix coutr.xt. ix wl,ether fuUuwiu~ diffcrentinl tY{uxtiou Il:w R xtRble lixrrl






Wltll W(x„x1}1) - ( IS xlil)-ó.
Hcucc, a fixed poiut á is E-gtnMc if
(37) ~W,(~,n)fWzlx,x)~ G 1.
whem. W, :md Wx rur. thc psu~ti~l dcrivrrtiv~l. Gun{urm t11iK tu tlre stallility condition (34)
from tl,c prr.vioaF rwv~tiou w6iclt lusiug tLc notxti~m ( 3G) Yir.ldx
dx~tl - I Fx,lx,x)W,l~,x) f F,~ ( ~,~) G 1.
(~) I dx; I- 1 - F.,(à.à)Wz(x.x)
Gmditioua; (S7) ruid (~8) coiu:~i~ic uudcr tLc folluwiu{; couditioun:
l. xit, - (1 -rr,)x~ f:r,x, with :r, ~ (1.
'l. 3'I': I -~r,Wt1A,x) ~U Vl1T.
'll
Thr~RC conditionR Arc A R}xrial cwrc nf propoRition 6. ' Hencc x" wÍII hc ulu;tahlc whetr.AR
x' miqht bc Rtablc. ThiR sJRr, illnRtrAtrx thc conucction INtwr.ru Aiirq)tivc IcAlning in roAl
tiluc smd E-Rtability iu tictitiuuR tilnc. Thr~ Rtnbility critcriA only },wc thc RAmr. conditionR
fnr r`x~rv-tatiouR ndr~c likc
ait ~ -(1 - trr )a; t rr~xr with ar -1 0.
Thc couucctiou hrcAlCR WhCll t00 II1tICh wcight iR pnt nn x,.
8 Conclusion
The pnrpr~ r~f thiR }ktpcr iR a RyRtclnatic Rturly how rliffcrcut :ulAptivic exprrtAtlolur
R}~cihcationR Affrct thc RG~thility of RtAtinnAry REE in OLG modclR. In sm ecnuou)y with
lxerfn-t forer.ight A};entR, thc :ultarky REE, which hrw a~ouunticnlly uunrx,usicAl pro}NrticR,
iR Rt:~lslc, whilr~ thc RcuRihlc woucttlry REE iR nuxtalslc. Wc tiud that Rtallility for ecnuomirxc
with sulAptive A};entR depenrjR vory nulch on certsuu pnr{x~rticx nf the ex}x.rtsttion fornuttiou
RprriBcation. Henrn, it iR hstrd to draw suly genrrrJ conclasion rdxtot ecplilihrium Rek.rtion
viA Adxptive ex}~tAtionR. Onr tnsun rrxldtR :vc aR followR. Undcr pcrfiv-t foreRight thc
low inHs~tion REE iR ttnxtahlc whilc, thc high iutlxtirnt REE iR Rtad~lc. Whcu agentR form
thcir expr~c~tationR rw sul avcrstFe nf luuct pricr IctKax then thc Rtahility n,vr.reueR. The sws~yeiR
when Icarniug takeR place ou thc lu1RiR of inJintion rntee iR mom rntnplrex. Whcu s4;entR Atr.
Allowni to inclndc curn nt iuflAtiun into thcir fnrry~:wt fuuctinn, then thr, hit;h iudsttiou REE
tenclR to }~ RtAble for A f.tirly qc.uerAl cInRR of adaptivr, lo.Aming Rtux-ificationR. The high
inflation REE only brcomrx: nlurtal)Ic when the wcight pnt on cnrcent inHAtion tav~omeR
ucgligihlc ovcr time. When sy;enta strr. rrxxtrictcxl to GumMl inflation, thcu thr. Inw inNsttiou
REE tendx to hc RtAblc. We Rtudy OLS lesu~ting sR sm exsunplc of thc frry;ility of Rtability
reRUItR with reR}~ct to thiR fcaturo. OLS Icarnint; stR Rtndicd hy Marcet Anrj Sargent (1rJ8sJ)
uw~R Iay~;rY1 pricr, IcvelR iu thc rcgn~xRinu rr.RUltiug iu rul nnxt.Ablc óigh iutlat.iou REE. Onco
currc.ut priccx arc includMi, thr, high inHAtiou REE bcrolnt~ locnlly RtAhlc. FStrtllcrmnm,
when A OLS rcgnx,Rion of rlhRCrvrKl inflatiou rAtr~ on A rnuRtant iR rnnaidr.rrVi, thcn thc high
inf~ation R.EE iR IlustAMc sal;stiu.
Wc conclndc that in light of thrxr~ rt~nltR, adaptivc Ic.,-vning iR not satlc to Ringlc ont ouo
R})CC.IfÍC REE. Slight cluingrx in thc ex}lrr~tation formatirnt ntlc changr. thc RtAbility of tha
REE completcly. In particulAr, both REE Arc kx~safly RtAblc undcr rxenaihh, tulAptivc ntlex.
Hencc, it iR doubtfiil whether rulAptivic expM-tatiolu arc A Rr.nxihlo equilibrium Rr.lrx-tiou
clevicc.
tpRlfr (IrYJi) só~~ws lhat th~~ óigó iuflatinu REE can M~ E-atahM wha~ thc r-rzn~ss supply fnncticm is
iucmasing ia the rxpecervl iaflnti~~n rab~.
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